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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Nortel2 bankruptcy case is simultaneously the biggest success and
biggest failure in the recent history of cross-border restructuring practice.
On the plus side, the coordinated sale of an insolvent telecom firm’s key
assets created a pool of value worth $7 billion—much larger than could
have been accomplished through piecemeal local liquidation of spectrum
licenses and intellectual property rights.3 Indeed, that pool of assets was
much more valuable than anybody imagined when the firm filed its
bankruptcy petition. On the minus side, the fights over value allocation
swallowed up a gargantuan part of that value—an estimated $2.6 billion.4
The fights centered on alleged entitlements to priority—upward
deviations from equal treatment and pro rata distribution. These fights
were complicated by Nortel’s structure as a global corporate group. The
claims were based on, among other things: (1) liens; (2) corporate
structure; (3) territorial jurisdiction; and (4) local statutory priorities.
Interactions among these claims to priority made it virtually impossible to
unscramble the egg.
The court’s answer to the problem, dividing the pool of value amongst
all proceedings pending for the Nortel group, has been characterized as a
partial substantive consolidation and has proven controversial. In our
view, the court’s solution—pari passu distribution by estate—reached the
right substantive result but got there by the wrong route. By calling the
approach “partial substantive consolidation,” the court framed its order as
relying on “substantive consolidation,” an extraordinary remedy that

2

In re Nortel Networks Inc., No. 11-53454(KG), 2016 WL 2584092, at *1 (Bankr. D. DE.
May 2, 2016).
3
Id. at *1.
4
Donald L. Swanson, The Monstrous Costs of Mediation Failures (the Nortel Networks
Bankruptcy, Part One), AM. BANKR. INST. (last visited Apr. 2, 2020),
https://www.abi.org/feed-item/the-monstrous-costs-of-mediation-failures-the-nortelnetworks-bankruptcy-part-one.
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disrespects the corporate form and is available only when the court finds
bad behavior or disrespect of corporate formalities.5
What actually happened was something far more mundane—a failure
by the various creditors to establish their claims to priority. The outcome
in Nortel is a natural incident of any rescue case involving an integrated
firm. The goal of corporate rescue is to preserve going concern value—the
surplus value of the consolidated enterprise. This is precisely the
increment of value that cannot be allocated amongst the various entities in
a corporate group.
In this paper we propose to rethink the method used to allocate both
enterprise value and governance power in rescue cases. Our approach
seeks to simplify value allocation in cases like Nortel without
disrespecting either the corporate form or disturbing property rights. As an
added benefit, we seek to correct a “governance” problem that adds
expense to the coordinated liquidation of consolidated firms and
endangers rescue in cases where a firm hopes to continue in operation.
As we see it, the common error is that creditors frequently assert
claims based on a top-down approach to distributional priority that rests
on a myth—the single distributional waterfall—that simply does not
reflect reality or the law. As we will discuss later, in multinational cases
involving corporate groups, claims to priority are plural rather than
hierarchical. In cases like Nortel, however, when bankruptcy entitlements
are mistakenly viewed as hierarchical, uncertainty about the location of
firm value and firm assets creates a knot of veto rights that, as a practical
matter, inverts the proper legal allocation of governance rights. Under
corporate law, governance rights generally run from the bottom up, with
power to decide the firm’s future lying with the fulcrum security or
residual claimant. By contrast distributional property rights run from the
top down, with asset-based claims being paid prior to unsecured claims or
equity. The higher a claimant’s distributional priority the weaker its claim
to control over the firm’s decisions.
Paradoxically, when a debtor’s value is uncertain, and multiple
creditors in multiple entities can claim seniority, claims to priority become
5

Nortel Networks Corp. (Re), [2015] ONSC 2987 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.); see Michael
Barrett, Substantive Consolidation After Nortel: The Treatment of Corporate Groups in
Canadian Insolvency Law, Insolvency Institute of Canada, available at
https://www.insolvency.ca/en/whatwedo/resources/SubstantiveConsolidationAfterNortel
_TheTreatmentofCorporateGroupsinCanadianInsolvencyLaw.pdf.
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veto rights. Multiple nominally senior creditors can use their claims to
distributional priority to hold a restructuring hostage, regardless of
whether their priority claim is realizable as a practical matter. The right to
be paid first becomes the right to decide. But worse, where there are
multiple such claims, the right to decide becomes a power to obstruct.
We suggest a simple, perhaps naïve, solution to this problem: a creditor
asserting priority should have the burden of establishing the realizable
value of its claim. Rather than assuming that the priority of entitlements
run from the top down, in rescue cases a claim’s priority should be
established from the bottom up; any claim to distributional entitlement that
exceeds a pari passu, pro rata distribution must be traced to particular
encumbered assets, or to enterprise value that can be situated in a distinct
entity. Further, such claims of priority should be limited to their
demonstrable realizable value.
This approach has an important practical benefit for governance
purposes; the veto-power associated with a claim of distributional priority
is fixed and can be satisfied by payment of the realizable amount. The key
move here, however, is not substantive consolidation; it is realization.
Opening a proceeding fixes the relative position of creditors and operates
as a realization on their collateral. To the extent that rescue increases the
value of the firm beyond the value of its component parts, that value is
shared. By shifting the burden of establishing priority, our approach
ensures that distribution can run from the top down, within entity (and
territorial) silos, while governance will run from the bottom up,
maximizing the value of the firm.
One feature of this approach is novel, however. Since priority claims
are limited to value that can be situated in particular assets or entities, a
significant portion of the value of the enterprise may be “homeless.” Since
the firm is insolvent, this is not “equity” that flows up to the parent.
Instead, it is enterprise value that inheres in the corporate group. Corporate
law does not, as a formal matter provide a place to put this residual going
concern value. Corporate groups are not “entities” in any legal sense.
However, the going concern value of a group is an asset of the group as a
whole. This pool of enterprise value that cannot be situated in any one
asset, entity or country constitutes a rump estate that must be shared.
Crucially, this pool of enterprise or going concern value is not
extraordinary (as it must be to merit substantive consolidation). Instead,
its existence is inherent in any rescue regime. The very essence and
purpose of rescue is to preserve firm specific value, in excess of the sum
of the parts. To the extent that local assets, entity assets, or liened assets
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prove insufficient to satisfy the creditor’s claim the deficiency should be
assertible against that residuum—the “rump estate.” As a practical matter
this is what happened in Nortel but calling it “substantive consolidation”
is a misnomer.
This article proceeds in three steps. First, it describes the current
architecture for dealing with the insolvency of corporate groups and the
problem posed by cases like Nortel and Lehman. Second, it details the
various types of claims to priority that can exist within a corporate group
and explores the nature of priority and develops the concept of “homeless
value.” Claims to priority may be hierarchical or they may be plural. They
may be traceable to assets, countries, or entities, or they may inhere in the
group. Regardless, when a firm continues to operate in bankruptcy, (or is
sold as a going concern) the relative position of the claimants must be fixed
at the outset. Thereafter, subject to respecting the priority of the newly
fixed claims, governance should be situated with the variable claimants to
this unsituated value—the “rump estate.” These are the claimants who will
benefit from any increase in value and pay for any decrease. Third,
working from the general bankruptcy principal of equal treatment or pro
rata distribution we suggest an approach to value allocation that would
vastly simplify cases like Nortel, but which also provides a mechanism to
allocate value in rescue cases where the firm continues to operate. The
simple point is that priority claimants should have the burden of
establishing the realizable value of their priority. This establishes an
entitlement floor for, and limits the veto rights of, these priority claimants.
As such, it provides a legal default for allocating value in going concern
sale cases, and a cram-down standard for restructurings.

II.

MODIFIED UNIVERSALISM AND ITS LIMITS: VALUE
MAXIMIZATION V. VALUE ALLOCATION

The past thirty years have seen a remarkable development of crossborder practice in insolvency cases. As major global corporate groups have
failed, administrators and judges around the globe have explored the limits
of their power to coordinate sales and restructurings in global cases. This
exploration has occurred largely under the principle of modified
universalism, a framework built on comity where local courts recognize
the effects of an insolvency proceeding commenced in one jurisdiction
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throughout the world.6 Global recognition allows for a coordinated
approach to realization of the value of the firm for the benefit of all
creditors, regardless of their respective location. Modified universalism
contemplates a single proceeding, pending at the debtor’s center of main
interest (COMI), that administers the firm and realizes on its value
globally. This global proceeding allows the administrator to pursue valuemaximizing strategies such as a going-concern sale or a recapitalization of
the firm. Modified universalism forms the basis for both the UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, and the European Union
Insolvency Regulation. Under both instruments local courts are called
upon to recognize and give effect to the orders of the COMI court. There
have been some hiccups along the way. For example, coordination is more
difficult when the members of a corporate group do not share the same
COMI.7 This has not proven fatal to the overarching vision, however, and
the recent promulgation of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Insolvency
of Corporate Groups should help in this regard.8
Value maximization has been the key driver of, and the payoff for
adopting the modified universalist approach.9 The legal framework is
procedural, but the benefits are substantive. Where global restructurings
have worked, they have been held together by the prospect of mutual
advantage. This concept of mutual advantage is both a practical corollary
and legal prerequisite to global cooperation—each creditor must be made
better off (or at least be “adequately protected”). Obtaining creditor
support of a collective solution, thus, requires a plan to offer an
improvement of position over going it alone—a going concern or
coordination surplus.
However, assuring mutual advantage requires an entitlement baseline,
both to assure creditors of fair treatment and to prevent creditors from
6

See Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2276, 2299, 2302 (2000); John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Model for
International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 935, 992 (2005). But see Lynn M. LoPucki,
Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 696, 750 (1998-1999). In previous articles, one of us has staked a claim to a slightly
different type of “universalism,” “universal proceduralism.” See Edward Janger, Universal
Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 819, 820-21 (2007). For the purposes of this essay,
the differences are not relevant. More to the point, the proposals discussed in this essay are
consistent with Universal Proceduralism, and in our view represent a necessary extension
to Modified Universalism.
7
See Irit Mevorach, The ‘Home Country‘ of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing
Insolvency, ICLQ vol. 57, April 2008 pp 427–448.
8
See text at note 39, infra.
9
See e.g., Irit Mevorach, The Future of Cross-Border Insolvency, 14-15 (2018).
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overreaching each other and the debtor.10 Where there is no entitlement
baseline, opportunistic use of situational leverage by key suppliers,
creditors or trading partners to extract concessions may destroy the
ongoing business, and fights over allocating going concern sale proceeds
can fritter away any collective benefit. As Nortel illustrates, fights over
allocating the additional increment of value created by a global insolvency
solution can endanger orderly resolution. Unfortunately, modified
universalism does not provide a mechanism or a basis for resolving
disputes about either how to maximize value (governance) or value
allocation (priority). Instead, it sits atop a congeries of corporate
governance regimes and systems of territorial priority, buoyed by the hope
that the parties and courts will work it out. To accomplish this, modified
universalism relies on broad principles like comity and adequate
protection. Miraculously, sometimes it works out, but it can get messy
(and expensive).

a. Value allocation and governance: the twin blind spots of
modified universalism
i.

Value Allocation and the Empty Core

As noted above, Nortel may serve as the best example for both the
success and failure of the modified; universalist approach. Instead of
liquidating the assets of the firm separately—as they were spread around
the world, Nortel’s administrators followed a coordinated strategy and
pooled the firm’s key assets (spectrum and intellectual property licenses)
which allowed them to sell these assets in a single auction. Here,
competing bids of major market participants drove the price up to
unforeseen levels and generated about $7 billion in cash.11 Valuemaximization happened. The modified universalist idea worked.
Nortel also provides the most vivid demonstration of the weak spot in
today’s international framework of cross-border insolvency. Modified
universalism lacks a global substantive legal framework for allocating the
excess value created by resolving the firm as an integrated whole. Once
the proceeds of the coordinated sale were locked in an escrow account, the
fight over value allocation began on a global scale. In Nortel, this fight
lasted for more than 8 years and generated costs estimated at $2.6 billion.12
10

Edward Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline in Cross-Border
Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 180, 181-82 (2014).
11
Nortel, supra note 2, at *2.
12
Id. at *16.
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A significant piece of that fight was due to US bondholders, who hoped to
receive larger distributions in the US than their Canadian or European
counterparts. After a costly attempt at mediation failed,13 the Canadian and
US courts solved this problem through a mechanism they called partial
substantive consolidation.14 The various estates shared pro rata in the value
of the assets of the company. Equality of distribution trumped claims to
priority based on nationality.15
A second example of the problem of value allocation in cross-border
cases arose in the Lehman bankruptcy.16 Lehman Brothers was a complex
global business.17 In order to keep track of its money, it had a centralized
cash management system.18 Operating funds were disbursed to
subsidiaries on a daily basis, but overnight they were returned to a central
account, managed out of London.19 When Lehman failed, disputes arose
as to whether funds were located in the subsidiaries all over the world, or
centralized in the subsidiary in London that operated the cash management
system. Significant assets were spent trying to answer the question, but at
the end of the day, the result was indeterminate. The money was in the
firm, but not in any one subsidiary at any one moment.
The difficulty in both cases was that money could not be distributed
to creditors until these disputes over priority were resolved. On the one
hand, the cases were successful at liquidating the businesses without
disputes over allocation standing in the way. On the other hand, the

13

Steven Church, Nortel Mediation Over Splitting $9 Billion Extended by Judge,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2013, 6:51 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201301-22/nortel-mediation-over-splitting-9-billion-extended-by-judge-1-;
Donald
L.
Swanson, The Monstrous Cost of Mediation Failures (the Nortel Networks Bankruptcy,
Part One), ABI, https://www.abi.org/feed-item/the-monstrous-costs-of-mediationfailures-the-nortel-networks-bankruptcy-part-one.
14
Id. at *1-2.
15
Peg Brickley, Nortel Creditors Fail to Reach Deal on How to Split $7.3 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 7, 2016, 5:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nortel-creditors-fail-to-reachdeal-on-how-to-split-7-3-billion-1475876175.
16
Lehman Bros. Special Fin. Inc. v. BNY Corp. Tr. Serv. Ltd. (In re Lehman Bros.
Holdings Inc.), 422 B.R. 407, 416 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010).
17
Richard Herring, The Challenge of Resolving Cross-Border Financial Institutions, 31
YALE J. ON REG., 853, 867 (2014).
18
Id. at 870.
19
Id.; see also Richard S. Miller et al., Lessons of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy: Global
Cash Management v. Legal Provincialism in Global Financial Markets – Legal, Policy and
Regulatory Analysis, 1 K & L GATES 1, 6-7 (2008), available at
http://www.klgates.com/global-financial-markets--legal-policy-and-regulatory-analysis11-17-2008/#lessons.
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absence of a robust set of rules for allocation made it extremely expensive
to figure out how to distribute the proceeds.
Nortel and Lehman demonstrate that, in global group cases, the
increment of untraceable value can be quite large, even when the value is
in the form of relatively discrete assets—cash, or the proceeds from the
sale of spectrum licenses. For many firms much of the firm’s value will
inhere in income generated by operations—the “going concern value” of
the firm. The increment of extra value that is generated by continuing the
operation of the business will often, by definition, be impossible to allocate
to a particular piece of property or to situate in a particular subsidiary or
country. When there are multiple claims to an undifferentiated pot of
money, then it is worth fighting over. And, when there is no principled
basis for distributing that pot, the allocation is necessarily arbitrary.
Moreover, negotiations among multiple claimants about “dividing the
dollars” frequently end in what game theorists call an “empty core,” with
the various stakeholders caught in an endless cycle of negotiation.20

ii.

Governance and Situational Leverage

The value allocation questions in both Nortel and Lehman arose after
the estate had realized on the value of the various businesses. This is not
always the case. Allocation questions may also arise in the midst of efforts
to keep the business afloat. The confounding of governance and allocation
is made worse when the claims of entitlement are used opportunistically
to hold a restructuring hostage to a reordering of the bankruptcy priority
scheme. In the US, a common issue is the need to pay “critical vendors.”21
Sometimes a key supplier or trading partner will refuse to do business with
the reorganizing debtor unless prepetition debts are paid in full.
Technically, this is a violation of the automatic stay, but the need to
preserve the trading relationship will often override the protection of the
stay. A similar example arises when airlines wish to honor their frequent
flyer mile program, or stores wish to honor their gift certificates in order
to maintain and preserve customer goodwill. As a practical matter, courts
routinely approve payments to such creditors. The basis for doing so is
unclear. Some US courts rely on 11 U.S.C. 105 and the so-called “doctrine
20

See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND
INSTITUTIONS (2d. ed. 2010) (explaining the idea about empty core and the divide of the
dollars claim); see Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE
L.J. 648, 687-98 (2010). Edward J. Janger, The Costs of Liquidity Enhancement:
Transparency Cost, Risk Alteration, and Coordination Problems, 4 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 39 (2009).
21
See, e.g., In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868–72 (7th Cir. 2004).
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of necessity.”22 Other courts rely on 11 U.S.C. 363(c) and the power to use
and sell property of the estate in the “ordinary course.”23 Neither rationale
is particularly satisfying, but, again, the practice is common. Courts in
other jurisdictions follow a similar line.24
Situational leverage is often a feature in the negotiation of debtor-inpossession financing. For example, in the Lyondell case, the court
approved a post-petition financing order under which, for each dollar
loaned on a secured basis, a dollar of unsecured prepetition debt would
also be rolled into the secured claim. 25 In other words, for each dollar
loaned, the debtor put up two dollars in collateral, one of which secured
the new money, and the other of which secured a previously unsecured
loan. The terms were extraordinarily generous, and the willingness of the
debtor to make such a promise flowed from the debtor’s acute need for
cash during the early stages of the case. 26
Debtor and judicial acquiescence to situational leverage also play a
role in cross-border restructurings. As Judge Gropper has pointed out,
“The usual practice is for U.S. debtors to pay all foreign creditors, not
merely priority creditors.”27 In other words, when a multinational
enterprise files for bankruptcy in the US and there is a desire to keep the
business operating, instead of relying on the protection of the automatic
stay the usual practice is simply to keep paying the foreign creditors,
notwithstanding that this prefers their prepetition claims over other
creditors who are not being paid.

22

In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824–25 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999).
In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 868–72 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Lehigh and New England
Ry. Co., 657 F.2d 570, 581 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 467 F.2d 100,
102 (3d Cir. 1972); In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 823–25 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999);
In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 171 B.R. 189, 191–92 (Bankr. D. Del. 1994).
24
See e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 11, 2004 – IX ZR
22/03 (Ger.) Enabling such payments based on a test of them being beneficial for the
overall estate similar to the “doctrine of necessity.”
25
Final Order (I) Authorizing Debtors (A) To Obtain Postpetition Financing, (B) To Utilize
Cash Collateral and (C) To Purchase Certain Assets and (II) Granting Adequate Protection
to Prepetition Secured Parties at 62, In re Lyondell Chem. Co., Case No. 09-10023 (REG)
(Mar. 1, 2009) [docket no. 1002]; see also, Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co., 963 F.2d 1490
(11th Cir. 1992); Texlon (couldn’t find cite to case).
26
Nicole M. Stephansen, Roll-up Financing Gains Prominence, LEXOLOGY (June 15,
2010),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cf36dbad-7ef5-4c72-a87c2cdce2840e85.
27
Hon. Allan Gropper, The Payment of Priority Claims in Cross-Border Insolvency Cases,
46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 571 (2011).
23
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Further, as one of us has noted in a previous article, secured creditors
frequently use their leverage to force a quick going concern sale. Such
sales often allocate all of the sale proceeds to the secured creditor claiming
a blanket lien, even where a more time consuming recapitalization of the
firm might have produced more value, and careful attention to procedure
and entitlements might have allowed value to flow through to the other
creditors. 28 Indeed, the US Supreme Court has recently recognized that it
is problematic when critical vendor motions, sales, structured dismissals
and other devices operate as end runs around the prescribe process for
confirming a plan of reorganization.29

iii.

Process v. Substance

In sum, modified universalism provides a procedure for coordinating
a case, but leaves decision-making and value allocation as open questions.
The principle of adequate protection nods in the direction of substantive
fairness,30 but the concept leaves many questions open. To what extent can
stakeholders insist on claims to priority as a baseline for their entitlement?
What law governs priority? How should claims to priority be valued, and
how should competing claims of priority be ordered?

b. Adequate protection and the problem of value allocation in
rescue
For the modified universalist, and particularly for the court hosting the
main proceeding in a cross-border case, understanding the relationship
between the entitlement floor for and the likelihood of international
recognition is crucial. The concept of adequate protection used by the
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency (the “MLCBI”)31
leaves at least two crucial questions unanswered, however: (1) should the
forum court apply its own priorities to distributional disputes or the
priorities that would apply to the claim; and (2) how should these priorities
be applied in rescue?
28

Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process
in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014) (discussing the transactional leverage
of secured creditors to disadvantage other claimants).
29
Czyewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 137 S. Ct. 973, 984-86 (2017).
30
Modified universalism also contemplates mechanisms for coordination, access and
participation. These build out the procedural framework, while adequate protection assures
that the process remains fair, and does not fundamentally disturb substantive rights.
31
G.A. Res. 52/158, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, (May 30, 1997); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1532.
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Territoriality and Allocation

Historically, insolvency law’s approach to value allocation has relied
on two defaults: liquidation and territorialism. Value has been allocated to
claims based on the location of the assets generating value and distributed
to the creditors able to assert their claims in the proceeding. In a piecemeal
liquidation, all value that is generated can easily be traced to the asset sold.
There is no extra value. The location of an asset may therefore easily work
as the (only) determinant for allocation of the value received from its sale.
Territorial insolvency proceedings would claim and distribute the value of
assets in their territory to creditors with a claim against the debtor firm.
The European Insolvency Regulation (EIR) provides for this exact rule in
its original art. 2(g)32 and maintained this baseline rule in its recast art. 2
(9) (vii).33
Such rules for allocation of assets are often local rules, though
sometimes they have regional character (as art. 2 EIR).34 In a global
dispute about allocation, however, they cannot govern the outcome of the
dispute for all participants. In addition, such rules have not yet been
developed for all kinds of assets, and even where they address specific
assets classes (e.g. Art. 2 (9) with different rules applied to registered
assets, financial instruments, cash, intellectual property, tangible property
and claims), they were not designed to be applied in a group scenario
where gaming these rules is easy.35 Lacking any coherent global standard,
the international practice has required the parties to negotiate a distribution
scheme by themselves. However, such a contract amongst more than two
parties is not easy to negotiate.
Global rescue challenges both the liquidation and the territorial
paradigm. Because the debtor continues in operation, the value of assets
conceptually (but not legally) merges into the value of the firm. Because
the enterprise is global, the territorial approach is disrupted by the
reallocation of assets both before and after commencement of main
proceedings abroad, especially in a group context. Assets may be moved
from one jurisdiction to another for financial or tax reasons. They also may
32

Commission Regulation, 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, O.J.
(L 160) 1, 5 (EC).
33
Commission Regulation 2015/848 of 20 May, 2015, Insolvency Proceedings, 2015 O.J.
(L141) 19, 19-72.
34
Id.
35
Case C-649/13, Comité d’entreprise de Nortel Networks SA and Others, 2015 E.C.R. 1.
(addressing the resulting disputes about allocation).

2020

SOLVING NORTEL

343

move within the group from entity to entity. The location of intangible
assets is difficult to determine. Worse yet, not all of the value of the firm
that continues to operate can be tied to particular assets.36 While the
common approach seeks to bring the value of an operating cross border
business “down to earth” by attaching it to assets, this is a fiction. The
value actually remains “in the air.”

ii.

Facilitating a Global Cross Border Consensus

Adjacent to the cross-border architecture, many jurisdictions seek to
solve the allocation problem with ADR instruments. Mediation and
arbitration of a cross border value distribution scheme is advised and
sometimes even practically required. In Nortel, mediation and arbitration
were the first choice after initial negotiations stalled. Without a mechanism
for establishing the entitlement baseline, however, they failed.37
Under the existing Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency, a plan of
reorganization promulgated by the court at the debtor’s COMI will be
recognized so long as the interests of creditors are “adequately
protected.”38 UNCITRAL has recently proposed two new instruments to
enhance the recognition regime of the original Model Law. The recently
promulgated UNCITRAL Model Laws on the Insolvency of Enterprise
Groups aims at supporting the recognition process for plans of
reorganization promulgated for the entire group. This new instrument
seeks to facilitate the coordinated adoption of a global distribution scheme
by using local (territorial) recognition to enforce plans or reorganization.39
Under this model, parties would attempt to structure a “group solution”
formulated in one jurisdiction – a planning proceeding—to be recognized
locally in as many other jurisdictions as possible.40

36

See Edward J. Janger, The Logic and Limits of Liens, 2 U. OF ILL. L. REV. 589 (2015);
See also, Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating
Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018).
37
Steven Church, Nortel Mediation Over Splitting $9 Billion Extended by Judge,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2013 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-0122/nortel-mediation-over-splitting-9-billion-extended-by-judge-1-; Donald Swanson, The
Monstrous Costs of Mediation Failures (the Nortel Networks Bankruptcy, Part One),
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, https://www.abi.org/feed-item/the-monstrous-costsof-mediation-failures-the-nortel-networks-bankruptcy-part-one.
38
Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency Article 22.
39
Int’l Trade Law Comm’n, Rep of Working Group V (Insolvency Law) on the Work of
Its Fifty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/972 at 18-20 (2019).
40
Article 27 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on the Insolvency of Enterprise Groups
(available at: https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.165).
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This approach relies on the ability of receiving jurisdictions to develop
local procedures to approve and implement the group solution, and to give
meaning to the concept of “adequate protection.” Some jurisdictions might
require a local vote to bind local creditors. Other jurisdictions might be
more permissive, choosing to recognize the global solution because local
creditors had adequate opportunity to participate, and the solution is in the
best interest of the local claimants. Also, a confirmed plan could be
recognized across the globe, thus giving its distributional solution the
aspired global effect. The court confirming the proposed plan would,
however, need to apply the local tests reflecting the distributional
standards in its jurisdiction.41 This approach addresses the problem of
recognition without addressing the underlying problem of entitlement. It
remains to be seen whether host (receiving) jurisdictions will actually
recognize plans based on foreign distributional standards without
safeguards for their local entitlement policies.
As such, the UNCITRAL architecture can facilitate the recognition of
a global solution and provides a forum for bargaining in the shadow of
entitlement, it does not provide a set of entitlements, or a mechanism for
resolving disputes when claims of entitlement differ along national lines.

III.

ENTITLEMENT AND
BANKRUPTCY CASES

GOVERNANCE

IN

GLOBAL

As noted above, the global bankruptcy architecture developed by
UNCITRAL does not provide a mechanism for resolving questions of
priority. Instead, it takes claims to priority as it finds them. Cases like
Nortel and Lehman demonstrate the costs of such an approach. The
problem faced by a judge or mediator in a global rescue case is that there
41

United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgments, Art. 13 (Vienna: United
Nations, 2018),
https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Interim_MLIJ.pdf; United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, Enterprise Group Insolvency: Draft Model
Law, art.
20
(Vienna:
United
Nations,
2018),
https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/draft_model_law_on_enterprise_group_i
nsolvency_0.pdf. In the US, the confirmation would need to follow the requirements of 11
U.S.C. § 1129 and include a best interest test as well as the application of the absolute
priority rule. In other jurisdictions other tests may be required. In addition, the decision to
recognize a foreign plan in a host jurisdiction would commonly include a test of adherence
to local distributional standards, either following a specific provision (see e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 1507) or based on a public policy requirement (see e.g. art. 34 EIR). Globally uniform
distributional standards are non- existent.
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may be multiple bases for claims to priority, and it is difficult to
disentangle them.

a. Entitlement: Equality v. Priority
There are essentially two approaches to such distributional questions
that could have resolved the allocative uncertainty that bedeviled Nortel
more simply: a presumption of equality (bottom up); or a clear system of
priority (top down). Broadly speaking, bankruptcy favors equality (pari
passu treatment and pro rata distribution).42 By contrast transactional
lawyers, bankers, and most finance and law and econ theorists favor
priority and assert the desirability, under non-bankruptcy law, of a
“hierarchical” capital structure—a single waterfall, where A is paid in full
before B receives anything, and who must be paid in full before C takes
anything. 43
For single solvent companies the difference matters little. Distribution
runs from the top, governance from the bottom. The distributional
waterfall situates governance control in the hands of the junior-most class
(common equity).44 Hierarchy—the distributional waterfall—serves only
to distinguish fixed claimants with priority—who will be paid in full—
from the claimant at the bottom, whose claim is variable and therefore
faces and benefits from the risks of continued operation. 45 For solvent
firms, the levels of hierarchy are irrelevant. Equity is variable; debt
(regardless of its priority) is fixed.

b. Priority v. Governance in Insolvency–The Problem of
Vetoes
In insolvency and its vicinity, even for a simple firm without
subsidiaries or international operations, the implications of the two
approaches diverge. Indeed, they invert and go to war. The wedge is
uncertainty–specifically uncertainty about valuation in the future. In the
42

Worsley v. DeMattos, 97 Eng. Rep. 407, 412 (K.B. 1758). See Edward J. Janger, The
Creditors' Bargain Reconstituted: Comments on Barry Adler's The Creditors' Bargain
Revisited, 167 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE (2019). Some recent commentators question the
importance of equality of treatment, and the pari passu baseline in particular. David A.
Skeel, The Empty Idea of “Equality of Creditors,” 166 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (2018); Rizwan
Jameel Mokal, Priority as Pathology: The pari passu Myth, 60 CAMB. L.J. 581 (2001).
43
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value
in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 677 (2018.)
44
Id. at 689.
45
Peter Moles & Nicholas Terry, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TERMS
(Oxford University Press 1995) (shareholders are entitled to the remaining assets once the
fixed claims on a business have been met).
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vicinity of insolvency, a firm is not certain to be able to pay its fixed
claimants in full. It is, therefore, no longer clear who is variable, who is
fixed, and who is out of the money. Worse yet, in a hierarchical
distributional scheme, where every claim is potentially variable,
everybody has a veto over the continued operation of the firm. Instead of
governance running from the bottom up, veto power runs from the top
down. Priority claimants must be assured that they will be paid in full
before governance power moves down to the next rung on the priority
ladder. By contrast, in a regime of equality, all claimants share equally in
the future of the firm, and decisions about value maximization are
unconflicted, but priority is not respected. In a regime that respects
priority, conditions of uncertainty mean that veto rights will run from the
top down. The choice between equality and priority is, therefore, fraught.

c. Priority in the Insolvency of Global Groups: A Taxonomy
To make matters worse, the top down approach to governance
assumes a single waterfall. The problem posed by global enterprises like
Nortel with an integrated business that operates with multiple functional
and national subsidiaries is that multiple distributional waterfalls are
inevitable. Each subsidiary has its own distributional waterfall. Each
country has its own jurisdictional power over local assets and claims. Each
asset may be subject to multiple claims of ownership. Untangling these
claims to priority is complicated, and inevitable. Before they can be
disentangled, it is necessary to identify the various types of priority. Stated
briefly they are: (1) asset-based priority (security); (2) structural priority
(corporate form); (3) territorial priority (based on jurisdictional control
over assets and priority of local claims) and (4) value-based or waterfall
priority (priority creditors, general unsecured creditors, and equity). Each
of these claims establishes its priority in a different way, and, except for
waterfall priority, each relies on non-bankruptcy entitlements that are
extrinsic to establish their priority over other claims to the value of the
firm.

i.

Security

Secured creditors have claims to priority that are based on a claim to
“ownership” or a property interest in the debtor’s assets.46 The debtor can
bind the secured creditor by redeeming the collateral at its value. This may
be considerably less than at par. This is because these claims to priority
46

U.C.C § 9-109(a) (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977).
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are based on non-bankruptcy property law: the state law of real property
mortgages; and the state law of personal property security (Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code in the U.S.). Similar rules exist in many
jurisdictions including, for instance, Germany.47 What they offer are not
liens on the value of the firm itself, but instead liens on the firm’s specific
assets.
For this reason, the claim to priority is limited to the value of the
investor’s collateral—the encumbered assets.48 Practitioners and law and
economics scholars frequently assume that it is possible to encumber the
going concern value of a firm and assert that as a normative matter that
this is desirable. However, at least in the US, the limits of the propertybased approach found in Article 9, and the absence of a statutory “floating
charge” that reaches going concern value, together limit the scope of
security to “property” owned by the firm.49 Even the scholars who favor
such a lien recognize that it either does not exist under current law, or at
least rests on a “shaky foundation.”50

47

In Germany, property law defines such security, See §§ §§ 1113-1203 BGB (Civil Code)
for mortgages and §§ 1204-1296 BGB for pledges.
48
11 U.S.C. § 506, 552, 1129(b)(2)(A) (2010). See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger,
Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673 (2018).
49
Sarah Paterson, Finding Our Way: Secured Transactions and Corporate Bankruptcy
Law and Policy an America and England, 18 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 247 (2018).
50
Christopher W. Frost, Secured Credit and Effective Entity Priority, 51 CONN. L. REV.
575, 612 (2019) (“effective entity priority rests on a fragile footing”). While Douglas Baird
acknowledges that:
A secured creditor's right is asset-based. A creditor is truly senior to another creditor
in a firm only to the extent that it has perfected a security interest in each and every
asset of the firm. Moreover, even if assets are not valued until the plan is confirmed,
the secured creditor's priority is limited to assets in which it had a perfected security
interest at the time the petition was filed, or assets acquired with the proceeds of that
security interest.
Id. at 856. But he also notes that:
Whether one looks at a secured creditor as holding the discrete parts worth less than
the going concern or whether it enjoys a right to the first cashflows of the firm is a
debate that will undoubtedly continue. Resolving these competing views is virtually
impossible. Both sides cling to their views as if they were articles of religious faith.
On the one hand are those who believe that when stock is taken in bankruptcy, no one
should be able to enjoy the assets to the absolute exclusion of other stakeholders. On
the other hand are those who believe that stakeholders have a place in line, and the
bankruptcy reckoning should respect it. The gap between these two views is likely
unbridgeable.
Id. at 860.
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Territoriality – Jurisdiction over property and priority
of local claims

Territorial claims to priority rely partly on the limited jurisdictional
scope of the bankruptcy proceeding, and partly on the fact that countries
may rank priorities differently.51 This can reorder the priority of claims in
two distinct ways. First, within a firm, the balance of claims and assets can
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In other words, the opening of a local
case may distort the “equal” priority of pari passu claims across the firm.
General creditors in one jurisdiction may receive a larger haircut than
claimants from another jurisdiction. Also, preferential or priority creditors
in one jurisdiction may have different (or no) priority in another.
Employee claims, tax claims, tort claims may all have different priorities
in different jurisdictions. This highlights the fact that where territorial
claims are involved, the distributional hierarchy must accommodate
multiple distributional waterfalls. Even a fully implemented regime of
modified universalism must wrestle with this problem unless it is prepared
to reject the concept of local priorities entirely.

iii.

Groups – Corporate Form and Structural Priority

There is yet a third form of priority—structural priority. Whereas the
usual rule for general unsecured creditors of an insolvent entity is that they
share pari passu (in equal priority) and pro rata (according to the
proportion of their claim), the corporate form can be used to structure
recourse.52 Formal partitions between assets can be created through the use
of the corporate form. Corporate structure can be used to elevate the
priority of claimants with recourse to the partitioned assets. However, as
Nortel and Lehman illustrate, in many modern corporate groups, it is often
difficult to discern where value is located. Are the receivables of a
particular subsidiary always tied directly to that subsidiary? Is the
subsidiary itself solvent? These questions become important when a
corporate group is recapitalized or sold as a going concern. To what extent
can a creditor of a group member show that they would have received a
bigger distribution if their recourse was limited to the subsidiary going it
alone? Again, like territorial claims to priority or preferred treatment, these
claims to priority are not based on the host nation’s bankruptcy priority
51

Edward J. Janger, Silos: Establishing the Distributional Baseline in Cross-Border
Bankruptcies, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 180 (2014).
52
Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web: Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’
Selective Enforcement 124 YALE L.J. 2680 (2015).
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scheme per se, but instead on the fact that a group member exists as a
separate value waterfall entirely.

iv.

Unsecured Priority Claims and Equity

All of the types of priority described above operate by deleting assets
from the pool available for pro rata distribution. They carve assets out of
the estate and dedicate them to satisfying a particular claim. Unsecured
creditors have a claim against the leftovers—the residual unencumbered
value of the firm. However, even within the class of claims that lack
collateral or a dedicated pool of assets, there may be priorities.
Administrative claims of the estate take priority over employee claims,
take priority over tax claims take priority over ordinary debt claims.53 And,
needless to say, ordinary debt claims take priority over equity interests.
While the basic bankruptcy principal of distribution is equality, the amount
left over to distribute to those claimants may be quite small or quite large.

d. Vetoes and Realizable Value
The lesson of the preceding section is that the idea of a single priority
waterfall is a myth, both as a legal and a practical matter. Instead, the
various claims to priority create a series of veto rights, each with the power
to block both a value maximizing rescue and a consensual distribution
scheme in a sale case.
The myth of waterfall priority has costs. Modern bankruptcy practice
has shifted its emphasis from liquidation to rescue in the form of
restructuring and going concern sales.54 This shift causes uncertainty and
confusion about claims to priority that arise on a number of axes: (1) there
is confusion about the nature of the entitlements that give rise to various
types of priority; (2) there is conflation of the nominal and realizable value
of those claims to priority. The exorbitant cost of cases like Nortel, and
also in cases where the business continues, comes from these intertwined
uncertainties about valuation and allocation. Where uncertainty is linked
to a formal priority, the result is a veto right to any approach that has a
consensual solution at its core. Where the veto cannot be satisfied by
payment in full, disputes hinder efficient solutions. In cases like Nortel the
53

11 U.S.C. § 507.
We recognize that Nortel was a liquidation and that In Lehman the fight was over the
location of particular assets. The point in those cases, was that in a modern corporate group,
even hard assets may be difficult to locate. In a rescue case, one of those elements of
homeless value is the going concern increment.
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result is that value is allocated to lawyers. In cases where rescue is in the
balance the result may be destruction of value altogether.

e. Allocation Is Not the Answer
The EIR takes one approach to this problem. It seeks (1) to solve the
territoriality problem by developing globally or regionally accepted
allocation rules (e.g. art. 2 (9) EIR) that pin both assets and claims to a
specific jurisdiction (including those of group entities); and (2) it applies
local rules on entitlement and distribution to solve questions about the
scope of security rights or waterfall entitlements. The European approach
establishes both allocation rules and seeks to respect local distribution
rules.
The limits of this approach become visible, however, when value
cannot be traced to specific assets and thus cannot be allocated. Just as a
firm is worth more than the value of its assets, a corporate group is worth
more than the sum of the value of its subsidiaries. As a result, the existence
of a pool of homeless value (In particular reorganization surplus value and
group synergy value) is an inevitable consequence of rescue and not
covered neatly by an approach that is based on priority. Such an approach
must bring value “down to earth” and assign it to a local distributional
framework. Such a step is artificial and often arbitrary. A new approach is
needed.

IV.

A NEW APPROACH TO VALUE TRACING
GROUP INSOLVENCIES

IN

CORPORATE

The great success of modified universalism is that it provides a process
to facilitate value maximization by preserving enterprise value either
through global recapitalization or coordinated going concern sales. The
greatest weakness is its silence on substance. The standard of adequate
protection provides no basis for breaking deadlocks when negotiations
fail.
We suggest a simple, perhaps naïve, mechanism for balancing claims
to priority against the principle of equal distribution: we would grant a
claim priority only to the extent that the claimant is able to establish the
realizable value of that claim in the absence of the global resolution of the
firm’s value. To put it concretely:
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•

Any claim to priority must be traced to realizable assets or to
value that can be situated in a distinct jurisdiction or entity and
distributed according to the respective local distribution
regime. This, of course, might include local avoidance rules.

•

Any remaining homeless, or un-situated value would
constitute what we call the “rump estate,” a residual pool of
value, left in the hands of the estate fiduciary. This would not
be a result of consolidation. It would simply be an incident of
rescue.

•

To the extent that local assets, entity assets, or liened assets
prove insufficient to satisfy the creditor’s claim they would
have a deficiency claim against the residuum. This rump
estate would then be shared on a pro rata basis amongst all
creditors with deficiency claims.

This approach provides both a cap and a floor to the priority claim.
Therefore, for governance purposes, the veto power associated with a
claim of distributional priority is fixed and limited to this realizable
amount.
Crucially, this approach does not require consolidation, disrespect of
the corporate form, or of abrogation of property rights. The key move here
is not consolidation; it is realization. The sale or recapitalization of the
firm creates a pool of realized value. Priority claimants can claim their
share, but only if they can prove it is theirs. This approach respects the
distributional priority of asset-based claims based on liens, and entitybased priority based on local corporate law, and territorial priority based
on jurisdictional authority. When an estate fiduciary realizes on the value
of the enterprise, it distributes the pool of value according to those
priorities, but only to the extent their realizable value can be established.
The residuum, the money left over, must go somewhere. So must the debt.
However, these deficiency claims have no particular claim to priority over
other unsecured claims, and they are not tied to assets or entities. These
deficiency claims share pro rata.
By shifting the burden of establishing priority, Our approach ensures that
distribution can run from the top down, while governance will run from
the bottom up; by fixing the value of the priority claims they can be cashed
out, leaving the residual claimants to maximize the value of the enterprise
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as a whole. It is our hope that this approach will minimize the stakes, and
hence the costs of allocation fights.
As we have noted, this approach mirrors the distributional approach
reached in Nortel. But, in our view, “partial substantive consolidation” is
a misnomer. It suggests that the court is invoking an extraordinary remedy
that disrespects the corporate form. Under our approach, no disrespect is
involved. We merely impose a requirement of proof and recognize that
some value cannot be situated. In our view, the problem lies not in
consolidating the pool of assets across corporate limits, but more generally
in fixing the claims to priority based on the realizable value of those assetbased, entity-based, or jurisdiction-claims to priority. Equality of
treatment solves the rest.

a. Fixing the Realizable Value of Priority Claims
A corporate group has aspects of separateness, but also operates, at
some level as a single entity or firm. Where liabilities and value can be
located in particular entities the analysis is straightforward. Those claims
may be satisfied out of that entity based on the realizable value of the
entity’s assets or the realizable stand-alone value of the entity. Any
deficiency continues as an orphan claim. Since recourse against the assets
or entity have been exhausted, and the “group” is not an entity, there is no
recourse against the group per se. Similarly, while many assets and much
firm value may be situated in single entities, jurisdictions, or may be
pledged to particular creditors, some assets may be homeless (like the cash
in Lehman), and some value may not be tied to assets. This forms what we
have referred to as the “rump estate.” Most importantly, going concern
value and various business synergies inhere in the firm. We are left with
orphan claims and homeless value.
For individual firms this analysis is straightforward. Where a group of
entities form a consolidated enterprise, however, the analysis is more
problematic. The homeless value may inhere in the group, rather than any
particular corporate entity. However, corporate law does not provide a
place to put this value. For a solvent firm, this value would flow up to the
corporate parent as equity. If the entities themselves are insolvent, the
stock is worthless. This will be true, even when the consolidated enterprise
has value over and above the value of the group members. The question
becomes how to administer the homeless value and orphan claims that
inhere in a rescue case.
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In a rescue case for a corporate group, the orphan claims should be
assertible against the rump estate. Each claim to priority against a group
member or assets of a group member is limited to the realizable value of
that priority claim, based either on the value of their encumbered asset, or
the realizable value of their claim against a particular entity. To the extent
that funds remain, all deficiency claims against the various estates would
be assertible against the rump estate.

b. The “Rump Estate”
The key point is that any creditor claiming a preference over pro rata
distribution should have to prove the realizable value of their priority
claim. Secured creditors’ priority would be allowed based on the realizable
value of their collateral according to the non-bankruptcy rules applicable
to such a realization. Creditors claiming a preference under a specific
territorial priority rule would need to demonstrate the realizable value of
this priority relying on assets covered by the respective jurisdiction.
Creditors claiming priority based on assets partitioned in a particular entity
would also need to demonstrate the realizable value of their claim.
It is possible that some group members may be solvent. If there
happens to be surplus value attached to assets in a subsidiary, equity would
be entitled to claim it. In practice, this would usually mean that creditors
with share pledges would come forward. Otherwise, the administrator of
the group entity holding the share could claim preference to such value.
Once all value that can be located in a jurisdiction, entity or asset has
been situated, that value can be applied to claims with the related
“priority.” However, inevitably there will be value that cannot be assigned.
It might be a little. It might be a lot. That will depend on the nature of the
firm. Whatever is left, however, for whatever reason, be it going concern
surplus, option value, homeless assets, or value that inheres in the group
itself, constitutes the rump estate. That residual value is available for pro
rata distribution across the firm on a global and firmwide basis.
Again, when this approach is applied to cases like Nortel or Lehman,
the answer is the same, but the result is reached as a simple accounting
matter, not through exercise of an extraordinary remedy.
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CONCLUSION

In sum, we do not propose any change to the rules of substantive
consolidation. Quite the opposite. Instead, we argue that the limits of the
corporate form be respected for distributional purposes. Neither do we
propose or intend any disrespect to principles of priority. Instead, we seek
to free both principles from the single waterfall liquidation paradigm and
adapt them to a global regime with multiple asset and value waterfalls. The
major conceptual innovation lies in allocating the burden of proof for
priority. Where the value of a corporate group is realized on a consolidated
basis, claims to special priority must be proven by the claimant, and the
priority entitlement is limited to the amount that could have been realized
by the creditor claiming against the asset or entity alone.
We do not propose anything that should not already be true under
current law. We simply consider more carefully how to implement these
principles. On a practical level, however, the implications of our approach
may be far reaching. For most modern integrated corporate groups, much
of the value will either be part of the integrated group or will be part of the
going concern surplus. As a result, a significant share of the value should
be available for pro rata distribution.

